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Group size, power allocation, and change: ,
Effects on conceptual representations of group interaction Pr
RADMILA PRIŠLIN, P. NIELS CHRISTENSEN and ELIZABETH JACOBS
This study examined conceptual representations of interactions between stable and changed minority and ma-
jority factions within groups that allocated power either according to size (power = size) or randomly. In support
of the hypothesized moderating effect of power allocation, it was found that both stable and changed minority and o
majority factions represented their interactions at low levels of inclusiveness when power was allocated according
to size. When, however, power was not associated with size, stable majorities, but not stable minorities, represented
group interactions at the inclusive level of a single group. Loss of the majority position significantly decreased this
inclusive level of representation but gain of the majority position did not result in the corresponding increase. Nev-
ertheless, the new majority in the random power condition represented its interaction with others at a significantly
1 higher level of inclusiveness than did the new majority in the "power = size" condition. These results suggest hat
! associating power with size invariably places interactions between the majority and the minority into the inter-
j group domain. Dissociating power from size, however, places such interactions within the intra-group domain for
~~ the stable majority and creates a potential for a similar socio-categorical structuring for the new majority (former (,
minority).
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Extending research on social change ftom the exami- documented discrepancy in the instrumentality of the two
nation of antecedents to the examination of consequences, positions for the satisfaction of important goals (for review,
Prišlin and her colleagues bave recently proposed a model see Prišlin & Christensen, in press). Because of its compara-
that focuses on group dynamics in the aftermath of change tive advantages, changes away ftom the positively valued
in minority and majority positions within a group (Prišlin, majority position presumably are experienced as losses and
Brewer, & Wilson, 2002; Prišlin & Christensen 2002; 2005; changes away ftom the negatively valued minority position
Prišlin, Limbert, & Wilson, 2000). The gain-loss asymme- presumably are experienced as gains. Responses to losses
try model of reactions to changes in minority and major- and comparable gains, however, are not symmetrical. The
ity positions builds on the documented socio-psychological former are generally more intense than the latter, reflecting
and economic ramifications of the minority and majority the loss-aversion efIect whereby losses loom larger than
positions to explain the consequences of departures ftom corresponding gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky,
these positions for group processes. The starting premise of 1994). Thus, changes away ftom the majority positions,
the model is that the majority position in a group is valued which are experienced as losses, should elicit negative re-
more positively than the minority position. The presumed actions that are stronger than positive reactions to changes
difIering valuation is derived ftom the empirically well- away ftom the minority positions, which are experienced
as gains.
To understand the processes that mediate these loss-aver-
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cially inclusive level ofin-group membership creates expec- ticipants' needs for validation (Festinger, 1954), and accept- '"~
tations of agreement and support (Turner & Oakes, 1989), ance or belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). ThOUgh sat-
disagreements are negatively valued. When disagreements isfaction ofthese needs thrOUgh others' support is important
amount to a level that changes one's position from majority (Prišlin & Wood, 2005), other, more tangible benefits are also
to minority, the result should be a decrease in valuation and, associated with being in the majority position (Christensen,
ultimately, de-categorization from the group. Minorities, on Prišlin, & Jacobs, 2005). Especially important among the
the other band, should be less likely to assimilate with and tangible benefits is social power, considered one of the basic
positively value the group from the very beginning due to a motivational domains ofvalues (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). "'
lack of similarity with those who dominate the group. Con- Yet, power allocation bas not been not been examined in
sequently, they should develop expectations for opposition previous tests of the gain-loss asymmetry model.
and disagreement from the group. When such expectations Early social psychological definitions of power tended to
are violated by former opponents who convert to their po- be ambiguous, suggesting the possibility of inducing forces
sition, minorities should react cautiously, only mildly im- of a certain magnitude on others (Lewin 1944/1951). Later
proving their reactions toward the group. In sum, change in conceptualizations specified the ability to control (Jones,
majority and minority positions within a group should be 1972), influence (Cartwright, 1959; Dah1, 1957; French &
associated with an overall decrease in identification with the Raven, 1959), or even coerce others (Moscovici, 1976; We-
group: Former majorities should disidentify from the group ber, 1947). More contemporary approaches to power, adopt-
whereas former minorities should not showa comparable ed in the present study, emphasize control over resources
increase in identification with the group. and outcomes (Fiske, 2004; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Ander-
Empirical support for the hypothesized effect was ob- son, 2003), for both oneself and others (Reicher & Levine,
tained in a series of studies in which a participant and sever- 1994). Common to these conceptualizations is the idea of
al confederates exchanged their opinions on relevant social asymmetrical interdependence between the powerful and
issues (Prišlin, Brewer, & Wilson, 2002; Prišlin & Chris- the powerless, with the latler depending on the former but"
tensen, 2002; Prišlin, Limbert, & Bauer, 2000). In these not vice versa (Ellemers, van Rijswijk, Bruins, & de Gilder,
studies, participants initially were placed either in a majority 1998; Fiske, Morling, & Stevens, 1996; Thibaut & Kelly,
position, receiving support from most of the confederates, 1959). In many instances, this asymmetrical interdepend-
or in a minority position, being opposed by most of the con- ence exists between the majority and the minority (Gui-
federates. Participants subsequently either remained in their note, Judd, & Brauer, 2002; Sidanius & Veniegas, 2000).
initial position during the entire group interaction or moved Although size is not synonymous with power, the majority
to the opposite position (majority to minority or minority to wields power over the minority often enough to warrant fur-
majority) by virtue of confederates shifting from supporters ther tests of the gain-loss asymmetry model under circum-
to opponents or vice versa. As predicted, participants who stances where size explicitly co-varies with power.
moved from the majority to the minority showed a substan- The goal of the present study is to examine reactions
tial decrease in identification with the group as indicated to stable and reversed majority and minority positions un-
by reduced group-self similarity, group attraction, expecta- der circumstances in which power is either associated with
lions for positive interactions with the group, and prefer- size (power = size) or is unrelated to size of factions within
ences for group membership. In sharp contrast, participants the group. Specific reactions examined in this study include
who moved from the minority to the majority showed only conceptual representations of interactions among partici-
a small increase in identification with the group on these pants. Interactions can be conceptualized at varying levels
measures. Additional research bas documented that this pat- of inclusiveness (Allen, 1985), ranging from the unitary,
tem of reactions to majority-minority change is a specifi- one-group-level, thrOUgh two-separate-groups-level, to
cally group phenomenon (versus aggregates of individuals) separate-individuals-level (Dovidio, Gaerter, Isen, & Low-
and occurs when minority-majority reversals are generated rance, 1995; Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, & Pomare,
by attitude change among existing group members (versus 1990). That is, an interaction with others can be represent-
an influx of new members). New majorities can increase ed as an interaction occurring within one inclusive group,
their identification with the group, but only under a circum- between two factions within a group, or among separate
scribed set of conditions that include receiving genuine and individuals. Conceptualizations reflecting different levels
continual support for their position (Prišlin & Christensen, of inclusiveness are associated with qualitatively different
2005; Prišlin, Levine, & Christensen, 2005). reactions toward interaction partners. In general, the more
Although previous studies bave provided solid evidence strongly an interaction is conceptualized as an exchange
in support of the gain-loss asymmetry model, they bave fo- among members of a single (unitary) group, the more fa-
cused almost exclusively on the context that creates intan- vorable the treatment of the included members (Dovidio et
gible advantages for majorities and, conversely, disadvan- al., 1995; Gaertner et al., 1990; Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio,
tages for minorities. Specifically, in previous studies, being Bachman, & Anastasio, 1994). The movement away from
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opposite, less inclusive conceptualizations (Tumer et al., the "campaign". Half of the participants expected that pow-
1987) is indicative of group disintegration. Thus, concep- ef, operationalized as the ability to evaluate and financially ~~
tual representations of group interaction provide a particu- reward others' work, would be given to those who won the '
larly relevant measure of dynamics within a group because campaign (power = size), whereas another half expected
they are diagnostic of the (dis)integrative forces operating that power would he assigned randomly (random power) in c'
among its members. the second half of the experiment. Following the campaign ~
We expected conceptual representations of interaction and before an alleged second, decision-making part of the
at uniformly low levels of inclusiveness among members experiment, participants indicated whether they conceived
of majorities and minorities whose numerical size co-var- of their interaction with others in the first, "political cam-
ies with power (i.e., majorities are powerful and minorities paign" part of the experiment as occurring at the level of a
are powerless). Power, per definitionem, creates asymme- single group, two separate groups, or separate individuals.
try in majority and minority relationships. Thus, the mi-
nority's dependence on the majority for relevant outcomes
and the majority's ability to control those outcomes should METHOD
high1ight the differences between the factions and preclude
representations at the inclusive level of one group. Rather, . . .
associating power with size should foster representations at Partlclpants and DesIgn
non-inclusive levels, primari1y at the level of two separategroups. Furthermore, the direct tangible outcomes ofhaving Of the 143 undergraduates who participated in exchange
power allocated by size should generate similar conceptual- for partia1 fulfi11ment of a course requirement, 104 were
izations regard1ess of the stability or change of the minority women and 39 were meD, average age M = 21.40 years (SD
and majority positions. = 3.98). Racial/ethnic composition of the sample was as"
When, however, numerical size does not co-vary with follows: 76 p~icip~ts wer~ White (non-His~anic) Al?eri-
power, we expected conceptual representations at the inclu- can, 32 wer.e HIspanIc. AmerIcan, 13 were Asla~ AmerIcan,
sive level of one group among members of stab1e majorities. 6 ~ere A~can AmerIcan, and.l ~ reported bemg of other
Their dominance within the group shou1d foster inc1usive- r~clal/ethnlc b.ackgrounds. Part!clpants ",:ere r~d.o~ly ~-
ness that encompasses even those few who diverge from s.lgned t~ th.e elght b~tw~en-subjects ~e!ls m ~ ~ ~ mltlal ~~Sl-
the prevailing ideas. For members of minorities, however, tlon: majorIty vs. mmorIty) x 2 (Stabll1t.r of mltla~ pOSltl~n:
inclusive representation should be less likely as they stand s~ble vs. changed) x 2 (power allocatlon: a.ssoclated wIth
in opposition to the dominant ideas. Furthermore, change Slze vs. random) x 3 (conc~p~a~ represe~tatlon: one gr~up
in position is expected to moderate reactions of majorities vs: two groups vs. separate ~dlvlduals) mlxed mo~e1.deslgn
and minorities when power in not allocated by size. Specifi- ~lth conceptual representatlon measured as a wlthm-sub-
cally, loss of the majority position should decrease inclusive jects factor.
representation among former majorities (new minorities)
whereas gain of the majority position shou1d not result in Procedure
a comparable increase among former minorities (new ma-
jorities).ln summary' when numerical size is not associated When one participant and five confederates, arbitrar-
with power, we expected to obtain the asymmetry in new- ily se1ected from a pool of 15 confederates, gathered in the
minority-new-majority reactions similar to the asymme- laboratory, the experimenter explained that the goal of the
try obtained in the earlier tests of the gain-Ioss asymmetry study was to examine group dynamics within political sys-
model of change (Prišlin, Brewer, & Wilson, 2002; Prišlin, tems. The experimenter further explained that the first part
Limbert, & Bauer, 2000). Conversely, when numerical size of the experiment would focus on political campaigns and
is associated with power (power = size), we expected con- the second part on political decision-making. In the first
ceptual representations at uniformly low levels of inclusive- part, a political candidate would attempt to win an election
ness. in a mock political campaign. The experimenter added that
These hypotheses were tested in an experiment in which following the campaign, political decisions wou1d me made
participants expressed their opinions on a number of relevant either by the majority faction or by randomly choosing one
social issues, trying to win support from five confederates of the two factions.
who acted as voters in a mock political campaign. Partici- Using an ostensibly random procedure, the participant
pants were either initially supported by most confederates to was always selected to play the role of the political candi-
be placed in the majority position or were opposed by most date in the mock political campaign and the confederates
of confederates to be placed in the minority position. These took the part of the voters. The participant attempted to win
positions either remained stable or were changed when sev- support of voters, expressing bis or her opinion on 10 so-
eral confederates converted from supporting (opposing) to cially relevant issues and offerlng a few of the strongest ar-
opposing (supporting) the participant in the second half of guments for the expressed opinions. The "campaign" issues
83
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included term limits for politicians, crime victirns' families of the experiment would be "writers" without power and
witnessing the execution of the criminal, financial assistance which would be "evaluators" with power.
to third world countries, religious institutions paying taxes, After answering the computer questionnaire that in-
increase in legal immigration, the death penalty, increased cluded measures of dependent variables, participants were
military spending, prosecuting adolescent murderers as probed for suspicion, thoroughly debriefed, and thanked for
adults, government regulation of health care costs, and pa- their participation.
rental consent for teenagers' abortions. After the participant
argued bis or her position on an issue, each of the confeder- IIb .th . d. . b Il lYleasures
ates responded y el er agreemg or Isagreemg ver a y
and then non-verbally by holding up a green (agree) or red . . . ..
(disagree) placard. These responses ostensibly were to pro- Concept~al representaflo~. P~lclpants"mdlcated ~.e
vide feedback to the candidate much like it is provided in a extent. to which they felt that the SIX of you who partlCI-
real-world political campaign context. Following exchanges pated m the stu~y ~e~ a) one gr~u~, b) two separate groups,
on the last issue, the voters decided whether to "elect" the and c) separate mdlvlduals (DovIdio et al., 1995).
candidate by a simple majority vote. Manipulation checks. The effectiveness of the manipu-
, The confederates responded to the participant's advoca- lati~ns of ~e. initia~ p~sition and change w~re assess~d by
" I cy in a pre-scripted manner to confer the majority or major- havm~ partlclpant.s mdlcate the. extent t~, which oth~rs.m the
ity position, which either remained stable or was changed experlm~nt~l sess~?n agreed With them ~t th~ begmn~g of
during the second half of the campaign. lnitial majority the sesslon an~ at ~e end of the seSSlon, resp~ctlvely.
versus initial minonty position was always established us- ~~ po~er ~anlpulatlon ~as evalua~ed ,by assessmg p~-
ing 4:2 (2:4) ratio of group members, including the partici- tlclpants bell~fs ,about thelT own factlon s power and thelT
pant. That is, initial majority position was established by 3 opponent factlon s power. c,
confederates agreeing and 2 confederates disagreeing with Several additional measures were taken that will not
the participant. Initial minority position was established be discussed beTe. All variables were assessed on a 9-point
by 4 confederates disagreeing and 1 confederate agreeing scale ranging from - 4 (not at al/) to +4 (very much).
with the participant. These positions either remained stable
thrOUghout the campaign or were changed when 2 confeder-
ates switched their alignment beginning on the sixth issue RESULTS
and continuing through the final vote. Thus, participants in
change conditions ended the interaction in a position that
was diametrically opposite to their starting positions. Those Manipulqtion Checks
who began as majorities were rendered minorities and those
who began as minorities became majorities. Initial position. A 2 (initial position: majority vs. mi-
After the final vote and before the participant was taken nority) x 2 (stability of initial position: stable vs. changed)
to an adjacent room to complete the dependent measures x 2 (power allocation: associated with size vs. random)
on a computer, the experimenter reminded the group about analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the estirnates of others'
the second, decision-making part of the experirnent. The ex- agreement with the participant at the beginning of the ses-
perimenter explained that "just as in real life," a faction with sion yielded the expected maiD effect ofinitial position, F(l,
vested interest in an issue would make a proposal that would 135) = 382.57, P < .001. Participants initially in the majority
then be evaluated for its merit and soundness. This required perceived that others initially agreed with them (M = 2.39)
a fuction to write a proposal ("writers") and another faction whereas participants initially in the minority perceived that("evaluators") to evaluate the proposal and distribute the ac- others initially disagreed with them (M = -2.43).
company ing $100 monetary reward (actual $100 bill was Change. A significant lnitial Position x Stability of lni-
shown to the participants). The experimenter further com- tial Position interaction effect on the estimates of agreement
mented that "evaluators" clearly would bave power over with the participant at the end of the session, F(l, 135) =
"writers," much as in real life decision-makers bave power 374.19, p < .001, indicated that the manipulation of change
over those for whom decisions are made. In the power asso- in the initial position was effective. Planned comparisons
ciatedwith size (power = size) conditions, the experirnenter within the majority conditions revealed significantly higher
explained that the smaller faction, which was in the minor- estimates of agreement among participants in the stable (M
ity at the end of the election, would be "writers" without = 2.40) than change condition (M = -2.35), 1(67) = 12.31,
power. The larger faction, (the majority at the end of the p < .001. Conversely, within the minority conditions, esti-
election), would be "evaluators" with power. Altematively, mates of the agreement were higher among participants in
in the random power conditions, the experimenter explained the change (M = 2.05) than stable condition (M = -2.94),
that a computer would be used to decide randomly which of 1(72) = 15.51, P < .001. These findings indicate that, as in-
the two factions created in the first, political campaign part tended, participants whose position moved away from the
84
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majority perceived that they lost supporl and those whose sentation) mixed model ANOVA with conceptual represen-
position moved toward the majority perceived that they tation measured as a within-subjects factor. A significant
gained supporl for their opinions. Conceptual Representation mall effect, F(l, 135) = 78.13,
Power. A significant Initial Position x Stability of Initial l! < .00.1, an Initial Position x Conceptual Represent,ation
Position interaction effect on estimates ofpower for one's mteractlon, F(I, 135) = 5.54,p < .05, a PowerAllocatlon x
own faction, F(l, 135) = 280.34,p < .001, was qualified by Conceptual Representation interaction, F(l, 135) = 5.24, p
a Initial Position x Stability of Initial Position x Power Al- < .05, and an Initial Position x Stability of Initial Position
location interaction, F(l, 135) = 216.20, p < .001. Planned x Conceptual Representation interaction, F(l, 135) = 11.37,
comparisons within the "power = size" conditions revealed P < .001, were qualified by an Initial position x Stability of
significantly higher estimates of power for one's own fac- Initial Position x Power Allocation x Conceptual Represen- !
tion in stable majorities (M= 3.61) than changed majorities tation interaction, F(l, 135) = 11.31, p < .001. To examine
. (M= -2.35),1(33) = 11.76, p < .001. In contrast, estimates in the effects of the independent variables on each of the three
stable minorities (M = -3.06) were significantly lower than levels of conceptual representations, we next conducted
in changedminorities (M= 3.44), 1(33)= 16.77,p< .001.As separate 2 x 2 x 2 (initial position x stability ofinitial posi-
anticipated, none of the differences within the random power tio? x power al!ocatio~) ANOVAs on participants' represen-
conditions was significant (M= 0.47, M= 0.06, M= -0.11, tatlons of the mteractlon at the level of(a) one group, (b) ,
. and M = 0.29, for the stable majorities, changed majorities, two separate groups, and (c) separate individuals. Following ~
-' stable minorities, and changed minorities, respectively; all our hypotheses, significant 3-way interactions were further I
ps > .23). Mirroring fuese findings, an ANOV A on estimates decomp~sed within each level of the power allocation fa~- t
of the opponent faction's power revealed a significant main tor. Speclfically, we compared the stable and changed condl-
effect ofpower, F(I, 135) = 4.93, p < .05, and an Initial Po- tions within each of the two initial position conditions and
sition x Stability of Initial Position interaction, F( 1, 135) = the initial majority and minority conditions within the twoQ
125.47, p < .00 I, which were qualified by an Initial Position change conditions. These planned comparisons were per-
x Stability ofInitial Position x Power Allocation interaction, formed using the Bonferroni adjustrnent for multiple com-
F(l, 135) = 101.93, p < .001. Planned comparisons within parisons on slightly correlated dependent variables11.
the "power = size" conditions revealed significantly lower One group representation. Significant main effects of
estimates of power for the opponent faction in stable ma- initial position, F(l, 135) = 12.85, p < .001, change, F(I,
jorities (M = -1.33) than in changed majorities (M= 3.35), 135) = 20.29,p < .001, power allocation, F(l, 135) = 18.40,
1(33)=6.73,p<.001.Conversely,estimatesoftheopponent p < .001, Initial Position x Change in Initial Position in-
faction's power given by stable minorities (M= 3.41) were teraction, F(I, 135) = 12.85, p < .001, and Initial Position
significantly higher than those given by changed minorities x Power Allocation interaction, F(I, 135) = 5.53, p < .05,
(M = -2.33), 1(33) = 11.36, p < .001. None of the differences were qualified by an Initial Position x Change in Initial Po-
., within the random power conditions was significant (M = sition x Power Allocation interaction, F(l, 135) = 7.64, p
0.00, M= 0.17, M= 0.56, and M= 0.19, for the stable ma- < .01 (see Table 1, row 1). Planned comparisons within the
jorities, changed majorities, stable minorities, and changed "power = size" conditions revealed significantly weaker
minorities, respectively; all ps > .29). These findings indi- one group conceptualization in changed than stable majori-
cate that, as intended, participants within the "power = size" ties, 1(33) = 4.22, p < .01. No other difference within the
conditions had higher estimates of power for their own fac- "power = size" conditions was statistically significant, all ts
tion and lower estimates for the opponent faction when they < 2.11, ns. Planned comparisons within the random power
were in a stable rather than a changed majority position. The conditions revealed significantly weaker one group concep-
reverse was true for the stable and changed minority posi- tualization in changed than stable majorities, 1(32) = 4.48,
tions. As expected, within the random power conditions, no p < .01. Moreover, this conceptualization was significantly
significant differences were observed. stronger in stable majorities than stable minorities, 1(33) =
In summary, results indicated that all three independent
variables: initial position, stability of the initial position, ' As uId b d fr . .
. . wo e expecte om postulates of the self-categonzatlon the-
and power allocatlon were successfully manipulated. ory (Tumer et al., 1987), conceptuaIization of the interaction at the
inclusive level of one group was negatively related to a less inclusive
conceptuaIization of interaction at the level of two separate groups (r
Conceptual Representations of the Interaction = -.28). Yet, contrary to a presumed exclusiveness of the one group
conceptuaIization and separate individuals conceptuaIization (Tumer
et al., 1987), our data indicate no association between the two con-
our hypotheses predict differential effects of the inde- ceptualizations (r = .04). This finding adds to the growing body of
pendent variables on conceptual representations of interac- evidence that the two levels of conceptualizations need not be mutu-
tion among participants in this study. To test these hypoth- aIly exclusive (Prišlin & Christensen, 2005; Simon, Aufderheide, &
eses we conducted a 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 (initial osition x stability ~~t~dt, 2000). FinaIly,. th~ two group ~onceptualization and separate
f .'. . . . . p mdlvlduals conceptuaIlZabon were mlldly negatlvely related (r =
O mltlal posItIon x power allocatlon x conceptual repre- -.13).
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Tab/e 1
Conceptual Representations of Group Interaction as a Function of Power Assignment, lnitial Position, and Change
Power = Size Random Power
Majority Minority Majority Minority
No Change Change No Change Change No Change Change No Change Change
(n= 18) (n= 17) (n= 17) (n= 18) (n= 17) (n= 17) (n= 18) (n=21)
One group
M -1.22 -2.82 -1.77 -3.00 1.41 -1.59 -2.11 -1.52
SD 1.26 0.95 2.14 1.65 1.23 2.48 2.32 1.29
Two Groups
M 1.72 2.29 2.06 2.83 0.71 2.18 2.50 1.05
SD 2.69 1.86 2.33 1.62 2.31 1.74 2.18 2.18
Separate Individuals
M 1.50 2.00 1.00 1.56 1.65 .88 -0.11 2.14
SD 1.82 1.84 2.64 1.85 2.21 2.74 2.49 1.53
Note. Higher numbers indicate stronger representations.
5.56, p < .0 I. No other difference within the random power DISCUSSION
conditions was statistically significant, all ts < .49, 118.
h fi d . . d rt ~ th h th .
. . . T e present n mgs prOVI e suppo lor e ypo eSIS
. Ad~rtl?nal ~alyses :o~~~ed each of the four con.dl- that power moderates representatio?s o: interactio.ns .among
tlo~s wrth~ the power - Slze. level o~~e po~er.allocatlon members of stable and changed mmonty and maJonty fac-
varlable WIth the correspondmg c.ondrtlons wlthm the. ran- tions within a group. Power affected all three levels of rep-
dom power level of th~ s~e vanable. These. co~~arlsons resentation: one-group, two separate groups, and separate
rev~al~~ that stab!e ~aJontles and changed mmontles (new individuals; however, its moderating effect was especially
~Jo~tle~) had slgnificantly strong~~ one gro.up co~ceptu- salient with respect to the one-group representation. As an-
~l~tl~n m 1?~ random power COndltl?n th~ m the powe; ticipated, when powe~ was allocated accor~ing to ~ize, none
- Slze condltlon of the power allocatlon vanable, both ts of the numerical factlons represented the mteractlon as oc-
3.14,ps < .05. curring at the level of a single group. Thus, majority and
Thlo groups representation. Representations of the inter- minority factions who disagreed on social issues agreed that
action as two groups were significantly affected by an Ini- they were not parts of a unitary social category. This was
tial Position x Change in Initial Position x Power Alloca- true irrespective of the stability or change in initial majority I
tion interaction, F(I, 135) = 4.73, p < .05 (see Table I, row and minority position. If anything, change intensified this .:
3). Planned comparisons revealed no significant difference refusal of a common group identity among those who lost
within the "power = size" or random power conditions, Is their initial majority position. Apparently, becoming a new
< 2.38, 118. However, comparisons across the two power al- minority within a group where power to evaluate and reward
looation conditions revealed that changed minorities (new others' work was given to the majority deepened an already
majorities) had significantly weaker two group conceptuali- existing rejection ofa common group identity. Coupled with
zation in the random power condition than in the "power = virtually no movement toward the common identity in a new
size" condition, 1(37) = 2.86,p < .05. majority, this finding indicates that social change within a
Separate individuals representation. A significant Initial gr~up where power i.s allo~ated a~cording t~ siz.e cements a
Position x Power Allocation interaction, F(I, 135) = 4.50,p unlson refusal of an mcluslve soclal categonzatlon.
< .05, was qualified by an Initial Position x Change in Initial Divorcing power from numerical size appeared to cre-
Position x Power Allocation interaction, F(I, 135) = 4.l8,p ate a more complex social categorization. Stable majority
< .05 (see Table I, row 5). Planned comparisons revealed no factions that did not expect an automatic climb to power
significant differences within the "power = size" conditions. because of its numerical supremacy did exhibit a consider-
Within the random power conditions, however, changed able sense of inclusiveness. They conceived of themselves
minorities (new majorities) had significantly stronger sepa- and others, including a minority faction, as a single group.
rate individuals representation than stable minorities, 1(37) Interestingly, their numerically inferior counterpart (stable
= 3.46, p < .01. No other difference emerged significant, Is minority) did not reciprocate such an inclusive categoriza-
< .22, ns. tion. The latter result corroborates previous findings about
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a smaller faction 's reluctance to share membership in the separate groups representation of interaction. Taken togeth- {
superior social category that also includes a larger faction er, these findings suggest an interesting possibility: Before ."
(Brewer, 1979; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; but see Do- re-categorizing their initial representations of the interaction \",
vidio et al., 1995). Thus, in a group with stable majority and (from two separate groups to a single group), new majorities ' ~
minority factions that do not associate their size with power, might first deconstruct the interaction to the level of sepa- / J
the dominant faction appears to develop a sense of "group- rate individuals. Representing the interaction as occurring at '~
ness" that is resisted by the minority. Yet, as predicted, upon the level of separate individuals strips away the usual mean- ),
losing their majority position, the new minority dramati- ing and preferential valuation of the majority position over !J
cally Iowered its sense of groupness, agreeing with the new the minority position (Prišlin et al., 2002). Thus, eliminating
majority that they did not constitute a single group. differential meanings of the two positions via individuation
Although social change appeared to have equated groups may be an intermediary step toward inclusiveness that the
within both power conditions in that neither had a unifying new - but not automatically powerful - majority may later
faction in the aftermath of change, it was not quite the case. develop. This speculation, however, calls for future studies
Direct comparisons of the one-group representation in the that should examine conceptual representations of the new
two power allocation conditions revealed two significant majority over a period of time (see Prišlin & Christensen,
differences: In comparison to the "power = size" condition, 2005).
in the random power allocation condition, both the stable If indeed the new majority that does not associate its
majority and new majority (former minority) had stronger size with power becomes gradually more inclusive, it would
one-group representations. The observed stronger sense of suggest that the initial detrimental effects of social change
inclusiveness in the new majority (former minority), might might eventually be overcome. The importance of inclusive
be especially important because of the faction's newly won representations in this proces s stems from research linking
dominance within the group. Thus, a new majority that is levels of representation to tolerance (e.g., Gaertner et al.,
not automatically given power within a group might emerge 1993), and procedural and distributive justice (e.g., Wen-
as a unifying force, especially if its inclusiveness intensi- zel, 2000). An inclusive level of categorization, a hallmark
fies over time. This possibility is suggested by our previous of the common in-group identity model (Gaertner et al.,
findings that new majorities improve their reactions toward 1993), is associated with favorable evaluation (Gaertner et
the group as their newly won position within the group sta- al., 1990; Dovidio et al., 1995), and helpfulness toward the
bilizes over time (Prišlin & Christensen, 2005). included group members (Dovidio, Gaertner, Validzic, Ma-
Further indicating that the moderating effect of power toka, Johnson, & Frazier, 1997). Inclusiveness is considered
reflects reactions of new majorities were findings about the an important, though not sufficient condition for tolerance
representation of interactions at the level of two separate (Waldzus, MulI:lmendey, Wenzel, & Weber, 2002). Moreo-
groups. Only new majorities in the two power allocation ver, the level of inclusiveness determines the boundaries of
conditions differed in the extent to which they represented justice concerns in that it defines potential recipients of pro-
the interaction as occurring at the level oftwo groups. The cedural and distributive entitlements (Wenzel, 2004). Thus,
new majority that did not expect power to come automati- individuals derive meanings and behavioral guidance from
cally with their position had significantly weaker two sepa- their conceptual representations of their interaction with
rate groups representation than did the new majority expect- others in terms of social categories.
ing to be powerful. Together with the findings about the In conclusion, the present study demonstrates that the
one-group representation, this result indicates that the new socio-categorical structuring of interactions between stable
majority is less likely to reject the inclusive level of catego- and changed minority and majority factions is strongly af-
rization when their newly won position is not automatically fected by the allocation of power. Our results indicate that
associated with power. Power assignment made explicitly associating power with numerical size invariably places in-
according to size may have ipso facto led to increased per- teractions between the majority and the minority into the
ceptions of two factions within a group, at the expense of a inter-group arena. Under no condition examined in this
more inclusive level of categorization. study did either faction conceptualize their interaction as
Interestingly, new majorities in the two power conditions occurring within an over-arching, one-group categorization.
did not differ in their representations of interaction at the Social change only intensifies such a conceptualization,
level of separate individuals. Rather, the critical difference moving factions even further away from a common identity.
emerged within the random power condition only. When When, however, power is not associated with size, interac-
power was dissociated from size, the newly established ma- tions for stable majorities occur in the intra-group arena.
jority (former minority) developed a significantly stronger Though stable minorities do not share their view, the finding
separate individuals representation of interaction than did that the prevailing faction within the group subscribes to the
the stable minority. Recall that new majority (former minor- common identity carries important implications. Because
ity) and stable minority did not differ in their rejection of the the inclusive, one-group level of conceptualization is asso-
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share common identity, it should contribute to less frictional Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison process-
if not more tolerant interactions between the stable majority es. Human Relations, 7, 117-140.
and the stable minority. Importantly, new majorities (former Fiske, S. T. (2004). Social beings: A core motivational ap-
minorities), do not immediately subscribe to the one-group proach to social psychology. Hoboken: Wiley.
conceptualization. Rather, they decrease their conceptuali- F. k S T M I .
B & St L E (1996) C tr 1 -
. f . . . th th . th I I IS e, . ., or mg,., evens,.. . on o
zahOD o mterachons WI o ers as occUlTmg at e eve I . If d th A th f .
ty tal tr I. .. mg se an o ers: eory o anxle meD con oof two separate groups and mcrease thelT percephon that . .' . '
th . t t .th th t . d. .d I Th. Id and soclal control. Personahty and Soclal Psychology
eymerac WI o ~rs.~separaem IVI ~as. . ISWOU Bulletin 22 115-123.
suggest that new majonhes may become mcluslve gradu- ' , .
ally: First abandoning their divisive two-group categoriza- French, J. R. P., & Rave~, B. (1959). ~e ~ases ~f soclal
tion and then replacing it with a more individuated level of power. In D. Cartwnght (Ed.), St~dles. In socl~l ~ow-
conceptualization. Eventually, they may develop the inc lu- er (pp. 150-167). Ann Arbor: Umverslty of Mlchlgan
sive, one-group conceptualization, especially iftheir newly Press.
won position remains stable over a period of time (Prišlin & Gaertner, S. L., Mann, J. A., Dovidio, J. F., MUlTell, A. J., &
Christensen, 2005). Pomare, M. (1990). How does cooperation reduce inter-
group bias? Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 59, 692-704.
REFERENCES Gaertner, S. L., Rust, M. C., Dovidio, J. F., Bachman, B. A.,
& Anastasio, P. A. (1994). The contact hypothesis: The
Allen, V. L. (1985).. Infra-group, intra-group and inter- role of a common ingroup identity in reducing inter-
group: Construing levels of organization in social influ- group bias. Small Group Research, 25,224-249.
ence. In S. Moscovici, G. Mugny & E. Van Avermaaet Guinote, A, Judd, C. M., & Brauer, M. (2002). Effects of
(Eds.), Perspective on minority influence (pp. 217-238). power on perceived and objective group variability:
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Evidence that more powerful groups are more variable.
Brewer, M. B. (1979). Ingroup bias in the minimal inter- JournalofPersonalityandSocialPsychology, 82,708-
group situation: A cognitive-motivational analysis. Psy- 721.
chological Bulletin, 86,307-324. Jones, J.M. (1972). Prejudice and racism. Reading, MA:
Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to be- Addison-Wesley.
long: Desire for interpersona1 attachments as a funda- Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An
mental human motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 117, analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263-
497-529. 291.
Cartwright, D. (1959). Afield theoretical conception ofpow- Ke;ltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. (2003). Pow-
ef. In D. Cartwright (Ed.), Studies in social power (pp. ef, approach, and inhibition. Psychological Revi~ 110,
86-103). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 265-284.
Christensen, P. N., Prišlin, R., & Jacobs, E. (2005). Motives Lewin, K. (1944/1951). Constructs in field theory. In K.
for seeking the majority: Effects ofpower, faction size, Lewin & D. Cartwright (Eds.), Field theory in social
and change. Unpublished manuscript, Radford Univer- science: Selected theoretical papers (pp. 3042). New
sity. York: Harper (Originally published in 1944).
Dahl, R. A. (1957). The concept of power. Behavioural Sci- Moscovici, S. (1976). Social influence and social change.
ence, 2,201-215. London: Academic Press.
Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., Isen, A. M., & Lowrance, Mullen, B., Brown, R., & Smith, C. (1992). Ingroup bias
R. (1995). Group representations and intergroup bias: as a function of salience, relevance, and status: An in-
Positive affect, similarity, and group size. Personality tegration. European Journal of Social Psychology, 22,
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21,856-865. 103-122.
Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., Validzic, A. Matoka, K., Prišlin, R., Brewer, M., & D. J. Wilson (2002). Changing
Johnson, B., & Frazier, S. (1997). Extending the ben- majority and minority positions within a group vs. an
efits of recategorization: Evaluations, self-disclosure, aggregate. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
and helping. Journal of Experimental Social Psychol- 28,640-647.
ogy, 33,401-420. Prišlin, R., & Christensen, P. N. (2002). Group conversion
Ellemers, N., van Rijswijk, W., Bruins, J., de Gilder, D. versus group expansion as modes of change in majority
(1998). Group commitment as a moderator of attribu- and minority positions: Alllosses hurt but only some
tional and behavioral responses to power use. European gains gratify. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
Journal ofSocial Psychology, 28,555-573. chology, 83, 1095-1102.
88




PRIŠLIN, CHRISTENSEN and JACOBS, Representations of group interaction, Review of Psychology, 2005, Vol 12, No. 2, 81-89
Prišlin, R., & Christensen, P. N. (2005). The effects ofsocial Simon, B., Aufderheide, B., & Hastedt, C. (2000). The
change within a group on membership preferences: To double negative effect: The (almost) paradoxical role of
leave or not to leave. Persona/ity and Socia/ Psycho/- the individual self in minority and majority members'
ogyBu//etin, 31, 595-606. information processing. British Journa/ ofSocia/ Psy-
Pr . šl .
R & Chri P N ( . ) S . I h ch%gy, 39,73-93. r
I m,., stensen, . . m press. ocla c ange
in the aftermath of successful minority influence. Euro- Tajfel, H. (1981). Human groups and socia/ categories:
pean Review ofSociai Psych%gy. Stu~ies .in socia/ psych%gy. Cambridge: Cambridge
Umverslty Press.
Prišlin, R., Levine, J., & Christensen, P. N. (2005). When Th.b W & K II H H (1959) Th . / h /
reasons matter: Quality of support affects reactions I ~~t, J. .,
N e J' k . W : I . e SOCla psyc o ogy
. . d . t t t U bi . h d OJ groups. ew xor: I ey.
to mcreasmg an consls en agreemen. npu IS e . .
manuscript, San Diego State University. Tversky, A. (1994). Contmgent preferences: Loss averslon
. . . and tradeoff contrast in decision making. Japanese Psy-Prišlm, R., Ltmbert, W. M., & Bauer, E. (2000). From ma- ch%gica/ Research 36 3-9.
jority to minority and vice versa: The asymmetrical ef- ' , .
fects of losing and gaining majority position within a Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Relcher, S. D.,
I
/ .r p / .
ty d S . / P h / & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the socia/
group. Journa OJ ersona I an OCla syc o ogy, . .
79 385-397 group: A self-categorlzatlon theory. Oxford and New
, . York: Basil Blackwell.
Prišlin, ~., & Wood,~. (20.05). Social i~uence: The role of Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J. (1989). Self-categorization theory
soclal consensusm attltudes and attltude change. In D. and social inftuence. In P. B. Paulus (Ed.), The psycho-
Albarracfn, B. T..Johnson, & ~. P. Zanna (Eds.), The /ogy ofgroup injluence (2nd ed., pp. 233-275). Hillsdale,
Handbook of Attltudes and Attltude Change (pp. 671- NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
706). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Waldzus, S., Murnmendey, A., Wenzel, M., & Weber, U.
Reicher, S., & Levine, M. (1994). Deindividuation, power (2002). Towards tolerance: Representations of superor-
relations between groups and the express ion of social dinate categories and perceived ingroup prorotypicality.
identity: The effects ofvisibility to the outgroup. British Journal of &perimental Social Psychology, 39, 31-47.
Journal ofSocialPsychology, 33, 145-163. Weber, M. (1947). The theory ofsocia/ and economic orga-
Schwartz, S. H., & Bilsky, W. (1987). Toward a universal nization. New York: Oxford University Press.
psychological structure of human values. Journa/ of Wenzel, M. (2000). Justice and identity: The significance of
Persona/ity and Socia/ Psych%gy, 53, 550-562. inclusion for perceptions of entitlement and the justice
Sidanius, J., & Veniegas, R.C. (2000). Gender and race dis- motive. Persona/ity and Socia/ Psych%gy Bu/letin,
crimination: The interactive nature of disadvantage. In 26, 157-176.
S. Oskamp (Ed.), Reducing prejudice and discrimina- Wenzel, M. (2004). Social identification as a determinant of
tion. The C/aremont symposium on app/ied socia/ psy- concems about individual-, group-, and inclusive-level
ch%gy (pp. 47-69). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. justice. Socia/Psych%gy Quarter/y, 67,70-87.
'-
89
